# China DA Supplements

# Neg

## Uniqueness

### 2NC/1NR --- Uniqueness Extension

#### US aligned in the Indo-Pacific now – plan shifts alliance commitments to Europe.

Hudson ’22 (John Hudson is a national security reporter at the Washington Post covering the State Department and diplomacy. “Russian aggression must not distract from China threat, Blinken says”, The Washington Post, May 26, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/26/russia-china-united-states-blinken/>)

The United States must remain focused on the economic and military threat posed by China despite the challenges presented by Russia and other top adversaries, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Thursday in a widely anticipated address on U.S.-China policy. The Biden administration has long singled-out China as the “biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century,” but Russia’s three-month war in Ukraine has consumed the White House’s time and attention as the death toll climbs and the fighting sends energy prices and inflation soaring. In Blinken’s address, the culmination of months of internal deliberations over how to approach Beijing, he emphasized that China, unlike Russia, is the only country powerful enough to challenge U.S. dominance on the world stage. “Even as President Putin’s war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China,” Blinken said. “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order, and increasingly the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it.” Blinken said allowing China to dominate the 21st century given its lack of respect for human rights “would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.” He specifically called out the country’s human rights practices in Tibet, Hong Kong and Xinjiang, where he accused Beijing of carrying out “genocide” against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. On a range of humanitarian, economic and security issues, Blinken said the United States was “more aligned with partners across the Indo-Pacific” than ever before. From the George W. Bush administration onward, American presidents have sought to reorient U.S. foreign and defense policy toward Asia, home to many of the world’s fastest-growing economies. But geopolitical events in Europe and the Middle East have presented myriad distractions.

#### Pivot to Asia now.

Sun, ’22 (Yun Sun directs the China program at the Stimson Center, a nonprofit think tank based in Washington D.C.. “After Biden's pivot to Asia, China feels the chill,” Politico, 6/23/22, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/06/23/after-biden-pivots-to-asia-china-feels-the-chill-00041590)-Alex

The Biden administration, hoping to counter China’s growing influence in Asia, has initiated several high-level engagements with Asia in recent months, ranging from summits to a presidential visit to the region. Despite lukewarm reception at home, it’s now clear that Washington’s Asia pivot caused much anxiety in China.

The administration's outreach started with Southeast Asia — the U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington in mid-May followed by President JOE BIDEN’s high-profile visit to South Korea and Japan on May 19-24. In Japan, Biden attended a summit with leaders of Japan, Australia and India (the Quad) and launched the long-expected[Indo-Pacific Economic Framework](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/23/asian-nations-biden-indo-pacific-economic-framework-00034247).

The anxiety that the outreach generated in Beijing was not limited to Biden’s comment in Tokyo that the U.S. will intervene militarily if China attacks Taiwan. More unsettling for Beijing was the public commitment by U.S. allies — South Korea and Japan — to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, which implied potential roles for them in a future Taiwan contingency.

In this sense, Biden’s Asia engagement is a good beginning to align with allies and partners. But the region will need to see even more of Washington and in a sustainable manner.

### 2NC/1NR --- AT: Ukraine UQ Thumper

#### US/EU prioritization of China has ramped up following the events in Ukraine.

Brunnstorm and Martina ’22 (Correspondents at Reuters, “U.S. can focus on two theaters - Indo-Pacific and war in Europe, official says”, Reuters February 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-can-focus-two-theaters-indo-pacific-war-europe-official-says-2022-02-28/)

The United States will keep its focus on the Indo-Pacific despite the Ukraine crisis, the White House Indo-Pacific policy coordinator said on Monday, adding Washington has been deeply engaged in two theaters simultaneously before, including during World War Two and the Cold War. "It’s difficult. It’s expensive. But it is also essential, and I believe that we’re entering a period where that is what will be demanded of the United States and this generation of Americans," the official, Kurt Campbell, told an event hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. "There is a deep recognition and intention here inside the government, in the White House, to sustain every element of our engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” Campbell said. Campbell said coming months would show U.S. "determination" to sustain high-level engagement with the region President Joe Biden has declared a priority for policy and resources in pushing back against China's expanding influence. Biden plans to host a summit with Southeast Asian leaders in March and attend a summit of the Quad grouping of the United States, Australia, Japan and India in May. read more Campbell said Biden would travel too for meetings involving Southeast Asian states this year. Biden is also sending a delegation of former senior security officials to Taiwan on Monday in a show of support for the island amid fears that China might seek to take advantage of a distracted West to move against it. "You will see a whole range of activities across the board, diplomatically, institutionally ... investment, and also economic and trade," Campbell said. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a director for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy at the White House National Security Council, said she was confident that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not divert from U.S. Indo-Pacific goals. "There is a way that the resources we are sending to Ukraine right now are actually quite distinct from what we are trying to do on the Indo Pacific strategy," she said. "That does not mean that we won’t feel moments of resource scarcity, but it does mean that we can plan both simultaneously." Campbell and Rapp-Hooper said the world was watching closely China's position towards Russia's invasion, which happened three weeks after Beijing and Moscow announced an enhanced strategic partnership. The White House has called on China to condemn Russia's actions, the largest assault on a European state since World War Two. Campbell said China was in an awkward position, but Washington wanted to keep communication lines with Beijing open. He said he believed Chinese leaders "have been concerned" by the solidarity of U.S. allies and partners and also by the "brutality" of Russia's invasion. "It is undeniable that right now China is occupying an awkward nexus in which they're trying to sustain their deep and fundamental relationship with Russia." Campbell said it was too early to tell what conclusions China would draw, but Washington had explained to Beijing in advance the risks associated with Russia's invasion. "It's clear from our perspective that the association, so public and so deep, between Russia and China is indeed quite uncomfortable right now." Beijing has largely steered clear of criticizing Moscow, but has stressed its traditional position on the need to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and last week abstained in a U.N. vote on a resolution condemning the Russian invasion. At the same event, the head of Asia policy for the European Union's diplomatic service, Gunnar Wiegand, also stressed the need to keep negotiation channels open with China, while the EU special envoy for the Indo-Pacific, Gabriele Visentin, said events in Ukraine would encourage the bloc to step up engagement with Asia.

## Links

### Link Uniqueness – China = Cyber Threat

#### China is the biggest cyber threat.

Perlroth 21 [Nicole, Nicole Perlroth is a cybersecurity and digital espionage reporter. She is the bestselling author of the book, “This Is How They Tell Me The World Ends,” about the global cyber arms race. “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.,” July 20, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html]

On Monday, the United States again accused China of cyberattacks. But these attacks were highly aggressive, and they reveal that China has transformed into a far more sophisticated and mature digital adversary than the one that flummoxed U.S. officials a decade ago. The Biden administration’s indictment for the cyberattacks, along with interviews with dozens of current and former American officials, shows that China has reorganized its hacking operations in the intervening years. While it once conducted relatively unsophisticated hacks of foreign companies, think tanks and government agencies, China is now perpetrating stealthy, decentralized digital assaults of American companies and interests around the world. Hacks that were conducted via sloppily worded spearphishing emails by units of the People’s Liberation Army are now carried out by an elite satellite network of contractors at front companies and universities that work at the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security, according to U.S. officials and the indictment. While phishing attacks remain, the espionage campaigns have gone underground and employ sophisticated techniques. Those include exploiting “zero-days,” or unknown security holes in widely used software like Microsoft’s Exchange email service and Pulse VPN security devices, which are harder to defend against and allow China’s hackers to operate undetected for longer periods. “What we’ve seen over the past two or three years is an upleveling” by China, said George Kurtz, the chief executive of the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike. “They operate more like a professional intelligence service than the smash-and-grab operators we saw in the past.” China has long been one of the biggest digital threats to the United States. In a 2009 classified National Intelligence Estimate, a document that represents the consensus of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, China and Russia topped the list of America’s online adversaries. But China was deemed the more immediate threat because of the volume of its industrial trade theft. But that threat is even more troubling now because of China’s revamping of its hacking operations. Furthermore, the Biden administration has turned cyberattacks — including ransomware attacks — into a major diplomatic front with superpowers like Russia, and U.S. relations with China have steadily deteriorated over issues including trade and tech supremacy.

#### China is a major cyber-threat to the US

Perlroth ’21 [Nicole Perlroth, covers cybersecurity and digital espionage for The New York Times. She has covered Russian hacks of nuclear plants, airports, and elections, North Korea's cyberattacks against movie studios, banks and hospitals, Iranian attacks on oil companies, banks and the Trump campaign and hundreds of Chinese cyberattacks, including a months-long hack of The Times. She is the author of the New York Times bestselling book “This Is How They Tell Me The World Ends,” about the global cyber arms race. The book, and several of her Times articles, have been optioned for television., “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.”, The New York Times, July 20, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/technology/china-hacking-us.html>] -Chinmay

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But that threat is even more troubling now because of China’s revamping of its hacking operations. Furthermore, the Biden administration has turned cyberattacks — including ransomware attacks — into a major diplomatic front with superpowers like Russia, and U.S. relations with China have steadily deteriorated over issues including trade and tech supremacy. China’s prominence in hacking first came to the fore in 2010 with attacks on Google and RSA, the security company, and again in 2013 with a hack of The New York Times. Those breaches and thousands of others prompted the Obama administration to finger China’s People’s Liberation Army hackers in a series of indictments for industrial trade theft in 2014. A single Shanghai-based unit of the People’s Liberation Army, known as Unit 61398, was responsible for hundreds — some estimated thousands — of breaches of American companies, The Times reported. In 2015, Obama officials threatened to greet President Xi Jinping of China with an announcement of sanctions on his first visit to the White House, after a particularly aggressive breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. In that attack, Chinese hackers made off with sensitive personal information, including more than 20 million fingerprints, for Americans who had been granted a security clearance. White House officials soon struck a deal that China would cease its hacking of American companies and interests for its industrial benefit. For 18 months during the Obama administration, security researchers and intelligence officials observed a notable drop in Chinese hacking. After President Donald J. Trump took office and accelerated trade conflicts and other tensions with China, the hacking resumed. By 2018, U.S. intelligence officials had noted a shift: People’s Liberation Army hackers had stood down and been replaced by operatives working at the behest of the Ministry of State Security, which handles China’s intelligence, security and secret police. Hacks of intellectual property, that benefited China’s economic plans, originated not from the P.L.A. but from a looser network of front companies and contractors, including engineers who worked for some of the country’s leading technology companies, according to intelligence officials and researchers. It was unclear how exactly China worked with these loosely affiliated hackers. Some cybersecurity experts speculated that the engineers were paid cash to moonlight for the state, while others said those in the network had no choice but to do whatever the state asked. In 2013, a classified U.S. National Security Agency memo said, “The exact affiliation with Chinese government entities is not known, but their activities indicate a probable intelligence requirement feed from China’s Ministry of State Security.” On Monday, the White House provided more clarity. In its detailed indictment, the United States accused China’s Ministry of State Security of being behind an aggressive assault on Microsoft’s Exchange email systems this year. The Justice Department separately indicted four Chinese nationals for coordinating the hacking of trade secrets from companies in aviation, defense, biopharmaceuticals and other industries. According to the indictments, Chinese nationals operated from front companies, like Hainan Xiandun, that the Ministry of State Security set up to give Chinese intelligence agencies plausible deniability. The indictment included a photo of one defendant, Ding Xiaoyang, a Hainan Xiandun employee, receiving a 2018 award from the Ministry of State Security for his work overseeing the front company’s hacks. The United States also accused Chinese universities of playing a critical role, recruiting students to the front companies and running their key business operations, like payroll. The indictment also pointed to Chinese “government-affiliated” hackers for conducting ransomware attacks that extort companies for millions of dollars. Scrutiny of ransomware attackers had previously largely fallen on Russia, Eastern Europe and North Korea. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said in a statement on Monday that China’s Ministry of State Security “has fostered an ecosystem of criminal contract hackers who carry out both state-sponsored activities and cybercrime for their own financial gain.” China has also clamped down on research about vulnerabilities in widely held software and hardware, which could potentially benefit the state’s surveillance, counterintelligence and cyberespionage campaigns. Last week, it announced a new policy requiring Chinese security researchers to notify the state within two days when they found security holes, such as the “zero-days” that the country relied on in the breach of Microsoft Exchange systems.

### Link --- Russia Focus Bad

#### China is increasingly becoming a larger threat – Especially as the west focuses on Russia

Rogin ’22 [Josh Rogin, columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a political analyst with CNN. He is also the author of Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the 21st Century, released March, 2021 by Houghton Mifflin Harcout. Previously, Josh has covered foreign policy and national security for Bloomberg View, Newsweek, The Daily Beast, Foreign Policy magazine, Congressional Quarterly, Federal Computer Week magazine, and Japan’s Asahi Shimbun., “China is expanding in the Pacific while the West is distracted”, The Washington Post, April 14, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/14/china-outmaneuvered-west-in-south-pacific-solomon-islands/>] -Chinmay

Officials and experts throughout Asia expressed shock last month when a leaked document emerged showing a draft of a “security cooperation” agreement between China and the Solomon Islands, a small former British colony in the South Pacific that has been independent since 1978. The draft agreement would enable Beijing to send armed police or military personnel, at the request of the Solomon Islands, for a variety of purposes, including to “assist in maintaining social order.” Marked confidential, the agreement would also expand the Chinese military’s ability to send ships and troops to protect Chinese people and projects on the islands. If you haven’t been paying attention to the Solomon Islands government, led by Beijing-friendly Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, you’re like most policymakers in Washington. But if you doubt the islands’ strategic significance, just look at the map. A Chinese military presence there would put People’s Liberation Army troops less than a five-hour flight from the eastern coast of Australia and far closer to U.S. territories than ever before. China surely hasn’t forgotten the role played by the Solomon Islands in World War II, especially during the 1942-43 Battle of Guadalcanal. “Ensuring that these islands, within striking distance of Australia and occupying critical strategic geography, remain free from Chinese coercion and military presence is a massive strategic imperative for the U.S. and Australia,” Alex Gray, director for Oceania and Indo-Pacific Security at the National Security Council during the Trump administration, told me. Predictably, Beijing says that the agreement is no big deal and is “beyond reproach.” But the U.S. and Australian governments have been scrambling to try to stop its completion. Australian officials are engaged in frantic shuttle diplomacy with the Sogavare government. President Biden’s top NSC official for Asia, Kurt Campbell, will become the administration’s first senior official to visit the Solomon Islands next week, in a regional tour that will include several other stops. It was Campbell who predicted in January that China would unveil a “strategic surprise” in the Pacific this year. Clearly, the U.S. and Australian governments had some indication that this was coming. Yet neither seems to have done much to try to prevent the Chinese move. Now, experts say, both governments are struggling to catch up to Beijing. “Reversing momentum, rather than stopping it in the first place, is risky and expensive,” said former Australian national security official John Lee, now with the Hudson Institute. “The failure to do more to prevent the deal from even being contemplated means the U.S. and allies will need to spend more resources and regional political capital than they would like.” Biden administration officials maintain that they are, in fact, heavily engaged in the Pacific Islands. Biden spoke to Pacific Island leaders in August, via Zoom. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Fiji in February. Last month, Biden appointed Ambassador Joseph Yun as a special envoy to work on completing negotiations to renew U.S. compacts with three other Pacific Island nations. State Department climate envoy John F. Kerry attended a conference in Palau this week. A senior Biden administration official told me that covid restrictions hampered face-to-face diplomacy until recently, but the official assured me that the Biden team is determined to step up the United States’ game in this region. Nevertheless, details of exactly how the Biden administration plans to try to persuade Sogavare to turn away from China are scarce. “This did not come as a surprise, and this is not the only place in the Pacific or globally where China is extraordinarily active,” the official said. "This is but a recent manifestation, and it’s probably one of the boldest." To be sure, the Solomon Islands is only one of many places in the Pacific Islands where China is expanding its influence. Beijing has persuaded two Pacific island countries to drop diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in recent years, including the Solomon Islands. China offers tempting packages of economic, diplomatic and military aid while bribing any and all corrupt leaders in these countries. Rather than reacting case by case, the United States and allied governments need to come to the table with substantive, long-term offers of aid and investment to reassure these Pacific Island nations that they have another option besides betting their future on partnership with Beijing. Russia is an urgent threat, but China is the more serious long-term competitor, only too happy to exploit our distraction. Xi has global ambitions, which means we must confront his aggression in many places at once. If the Pacific Islands become China’s outposts, the region and the world will be a much more dangerous place.

## Impact

### 2NC/1NR --- Impact Uniqueness

#### Uniqueness --- US would defend Taiwan now

McCurry and Ni 5-23 (Justin McCurry is Guardian's Tokyo correspondent, and Vincent Ni is the Guardian's China affairs correspondent. , “US would defend Taiwan if attacked by China, says Joe Biden,” May 23, 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/23/us-would-defend-taiwan-if-attacked-by-china-says-joe-biden>) -LM

President says US’s responsibility to protect island is ‘even stronger’ after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Joe Biden has said the US would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan if it came under attack from China, in an unusually forceful presidential statement in support of self-governing that drew a defiant response from Beijing. Speaking in Tokyo on the second day of his visit to Japan, and against the backdrop of growing concern over Chinese military activity in the region, Biden said the US’s responsibility to protect the self-ruled island – which China considers a renegade province – was “even stronger” after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.“That’s the commitment we made,” Biden said, after he told the Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida, that Washington backed Japan’s permanent membership of a reformed UN security council and Tokyo’s plans to beef up its security with record levels of defence spending, as it seeks to counter a nuclear-armed North Korea and an increasingly assertive China. The US president said any attempt by China to use force against Taiwan would “just not be appropriate … it would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine”.

### 2NC/1NR --- China Nukes o/w

#### China is a bigger nuclear threat than Russia

Martina, ’21 (Michael Martina is a graduate of Tshinga University, University of Florida and University of Washington. Now, he works as a political correspondent at Reuters. “China will soon surpass Russia as a nuclear threat –senior U.S. military official,” Reuters, 8/27/21, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-soon-surpass-russia-nuclear-threat-senior-us-military-official-2021-08-27/)-Alex

China, in the midst of a rapid nuclear weapons buildup, will soon surpass Russia as the United States' top nuclear threat, a senior U.S. military official said on Friday, warning that the two countries have no mechanisms to avert miscommunication. "There's going to be a point, a crossover point, where the number of threats presented by China will exceed the number of threats that currently Russia presents," Bussiere told an online forum. Unlike with Russia, the United States did not have any treaties or dialogue mechanism with China on the issue to "alleviate any misperceptions or confusion," he added.

### 2NC/1NR --- Deterrence Solves

#### U.S. military deters China from invading Taiwan – empirics.

Frison & Scobell, ’04. (Both Douglas Frison and Andrew Scobell are affiliated with the Strategic Studies Institute in the U.S. Army War College. “China’s Military Threat to Taiwan in the Era of Hu Jintao,” Strategic Studies Institute, 1/31/04, Pg. 3)-Alex

The CCP has long fostered nationalism over the Taiwan issue and the desire to unify the “motherland” as a means of building unity and drawing attention away from internal problems.4 This is especially true now, in an age when few Chinese are interested in communist ideology and few believe in Marxism-Leninism and/or Mao Zedong Thought. Chinese leaders also regard control over Taiwan as an important step in establishing Chinese influence in East Asia and blunting American influence. The loss of Taiwan through independence would be a critical blow to the Chinese regime. China will not give up it’s over fifty-year claim to Taiwan. Only the military might of the United States for the past half a century has prevented China from fulfilling the quest for reunification with Taiwan.

### 2NC/1NR --- AT: US Victory in Taiwan

#### China would be successful in a Taiwan invasion.

Luce and Dilanian ’21 (Dan De Luce is a reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit. Ken Dilanian is the intelligence and national security correspondent for NBC News, based in Washington. “China's growing firepower casts doubt on whether U.S. could defend Taiwan”, NBC, March 27 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-s-growing-firepower-casts-doubt-whether-u-s-could-n1262148)

China's massive arms buildup has raised doubts about America's ability to defend Taiwan if a war broke out, reflecting a shifting balance of power in the Pacific where American forces once dominated, U.S. officials and experts say. In simulated combat in which China attempts to invade Taiwan, the results are sobering and the United States often loses, said David Ochmanek, a former senior Defense Department official who helps run war games for the Pentagon at the RAND Corp. think tank. In tabletop exercises with America as the "blue team" facing off against a "red team" resembling China, Taiwan's air force is wiped out within minutes, U.S. air bases across the Pacific come under attack, and American warships and aircraft are held at bay by the long reach of China's vast missile arsenal, he said. "Even when the blue teams in our simulations and war games intervened in a determined way, they don't always succeed in defeating the invasion," Ochmanek said. A war over Taiwan remains a worst-case scenario that officials say is not imminent. But China's growing military prowess, coupled with its aggressive rhetoric, is turning Taiwan into a potential flashpoint between Beijing and Washington — and a test case for how the U.S. will confront China's superpower ambitions. The outgoing head of the U.S. military's Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, warned senators this month that the U.S. is losing its military edge over China, and that Beijing could decide to try to seize control of Taiwan by force by 2027.

## Philippines Add-on

### 2NC/1NR --- Read

#### Biden focusing on US-Philippine relations.

Oshin 6-26 [Olafimihan, Staff writer for the Hill. “Emhoff to lead delegation for Marcos’ inauguration in Philippines,” June 26, 2022. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3537739-emhoff-to-lead-delegation-for-marcos-inauguration-in-philippines/]

However, the Biden administration was quick to congratulate the new Philippines’ president, as it seeks to counter China’s influence in the region. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte, who remained widely popular during his term in office, maintained closer ties with China and Russia, while at times railing against the United States. Marcos has said in prior interviews that he wants his country to have a better relationship with the U.S. but also reiterated that he wants to maintain a positive relationship with China as well. In a phone call after his election win, Biden also expressed his interest to work with Marcos on expanding relations between the two countries.

#### However, Marcos Jr. is open to expanding relations with China now too – plus this card has impact uniqueness – SCS tensions are rising.

Kurlantzick 6-24 (Joshua Kurlantzick is senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). “What Can Be Learned From Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s First Weeks in Office?”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 24, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-can-be-learned-ferdinand-marcos-jrs-first-weeks-office>”,)

After winning a massive victory in the Philippine presidential elections in early May, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who was something of a cipher on the campaign trail, with few clearly enunciated policy proposals, has begun to formulate policies, make key appointments, and offer hints of what his presidency will be like – at least in the initial stages. For one, despite predictions by many analysts (including me) that relations between the Philippines and China had become so toxic in Philippine public opinion, and the Duterte administration had strategically moved back toward the United States, Marcos Jr., who long has had a close relationship with Beijing, seems ready to try to again prioritize Philippine-China ties. He may prioritize them even above links to the United States, which is still a treaty ally, of course. The United States certainly has wooed Marcos Jr. intensely, despite the fact that he never disowned his family’s past crimes, or the brutal record of his dictator father. As political analyst Richard Heydarian notes, despite the fact that Marcos Jr. still faces a contempt of court charge in the United States, the Biden administration sent Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to meet with Marcos Jr. in Manila, where she said that Marcos Jr. now has immunity from the former charge, setting the stage in the future for a Marcos Jr. visit to the White House. (Duterte, who has held strong personal anti-American views much of his life, never visited the United States as president, even as he rebuilt strategic ties with Washington later in his presidency.) And yet Marcos Jr. already has declared that China is the Philippines’ “strongest partner,” a statement that surely angered the Philippine defense establishment, which has warned of China’s growing encroachment in the South China Sea and is generally anti-China and in favor of closer U.S. ties. The statement also came while tensions were ramping up in the South China Sea again. Whether Marcos Jr. is able to get China to deliver on more of what it promised Duterte – more funding for infrastructure projects that actually get built – may determine whether he is able to pull off this move closer to China, or whether public opinion will swell to even higher anti-Beijing heights, limiting his options with China, like Duterte in the latter part of his presidency. Marcos Jr. clearly intends to turn to China for more economic assistance, but whether he will get what Duterte did not remains to be seen.

#### Faltering alliances in the region impedes US access to bases – an investment in Europe projects a lack of follow through in the Asian pacific.

Patton 6-1 (Ms. Patton is a research fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, “Australia., China Is Winning in Asia. Biden’s Plans Won’t Change That.” New York Times, June 1 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/01/opinion/us-biden-asia-china-economy-influence.html)

U.S. officials counter that the plan is more suited to the 21st century than “past models.” But potential Asian partners have trouble seeing what’s in it for them. A lack of buy-in could undermine the United States’ ability to set the rules on emerging issues like the digital economy, which would give American firms a leg up. Meanwhile, China has forged ahead. State-owned companies have locked up big projects around the region, often under the umbrella of China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative. China also practices persistent diplomacy. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s travels in Southeast Asia and the Pacific have far outstripped the pace of his U.S. counterpart, Antony Blinken. Despite the fanfare of Mr. Biden’s recent trip to Asia, it was his first to the region since taking office 16 months ago and included visits only to close allies South Korea and Japan. China also cultivates powerful elites. In the Philippines, its newly elected president and vice president have both politically benefited from China’s investments in their home constituencies. In Cambodia and the Solomon Islands, China has opened pathways for expanding its military presence far from home. In Indonesia, a strong relationship with the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment gives Beijing the access needed to pursue objectives such as deals for Huawei in the country’s 5G network. The United States does have something China lacks: time-tested alliances with what the Biden administration calls “like-minded” democracies such as its fellow members of the “Quad” grouping — Japan, Australia and India — as well as South Korea. The Quad is meant to demonstrate that the United States and its partners can provide an alternative to China on, for example, vaccines and infrastructure. But the Quad has yet to have much real impact. An ambitious pledge to deliver one billion vaccines to Indo-Pacific countries by the end of this year has run into manufacturing obstacles in India. The Quad, in fact, highlights an American weakness: The United States is strong in the democracies fringing the region but weak at the center in Southeast Asia. Over time, a more dominant China could impede U.S. military access to regional bases during crises, pose challenges for American companies doing business and force U.S. diplomats to work harder to make their voices heard.

#### Loss of Philippine bases destabilizes the SCS – escalates.

Baxter 20 [Caroline, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she focuses on issues related to operational strategy, base resiliency, expeditionary warfare, and military readiness. “If U.S. Forces Have to Leave the Philippines, Then What?”, Rand, February 28, 2020. https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/02/if-us-forces-have-to-leave-the-philippines-then-what.html]

Without the Philippines, U.S. forces would be faced with a series of math and physics problems from fighting from much farther away.

The closest military facilities to the South China Sea are in Okinawa (approximately 1,000 miles), South Korea (1,600 miles), mainland Japan (2,000 miles), Guam (2,000 miles), and Darwin, Australia (2,300 miles). Such distances present a number of logistical and operational complications.

Because their path would largely take them over open ocean, forces flowing from Japan or South Korea would not travel through foreign airspace, allowing for a much straighter and faster course. However, they would be coming from—and moving through—within the range of a sizable Chinese missile quiver. To reduce that vulnerability, operational planners might be forced to move the bulk of these units to Guam and Australia.

Such great distances produce a heavier logistical burden, especially for the Air Force. Fighter jets would need to be refueled en route more often, giving hostile forces two prime targets rather than one. The Philippines and Indonesia also might deny U.S. forces access to their airspace, making the route even more circuitous.

More time spent aloft also means planners would run into crew rest restrictions. Assuming a flying speed of Mach 1.6, an F-35 pilot flying a sortie from Darwin to the South China Sea would spend a minimum of four hours in transit round trip, plus the duration of the sortie. Afterward, that pilot would be out of the fight for at least 10 hours (PDF) on mandatory rest. Depending on the number of pilots available to fly and the operational tempo, ten hours can be a long time.

Beyond using Philippine bases as a forward operating location, these bases allow U.S. forces to preposition resupply materials close to the fight. Okinawa houses critical resupply materials, such as fuel and munitions for the Army and Air Force, but 1,000 miles is a long way when you're in need.

Logistical Bottlenecks Surround Taiwan

If Taiwan is the area of operations, some U.S. military facilities are much closer—but come with serious complications. Okinawa and mainland Japan are just 450 miles away; South Korea and Guam are 1,300 miles and 1,700 miles away, respectively. (Darwin, at 2,300 miles away is a less-viable operational hub.) Assuming the bulk of forces come from and through Japan and South Korea by virtue of proximity, a logistical bottleneck for all reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) could arise.

The finite number of airfields, ports, and roads, and the rules and regulations surrounding their use, presents a logistical challenge. For example, to move large, heavy vehicles on mainland Japan's roads, the U.S. military needs to request permission 45 days in advance and include proposed routes, the size and weight of each vehicle, and the specific map to be used. Permission is then granted not by the Ministry of Defense, but by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. In Okinawa, the Okinawan General Bureau adjudicates such requests at least 10 days in advance. Similar restrictions exist in South Korea.

While these restrictions could change during wartime, they would slow down U.S. force preparations before combat operations begin.

Time and Distance Are an Enemy

If the United States were to lose access to bases in the Philippines, the effects will ripple outward. With fewer options available, even simply for staging and prepositioning, heavier loads will wind up elsewhere. And yet that may be unacceptable for diplomatic or logistical reasons.

In the worst-case scenario, in which U.S. forces have to flow from the United States to a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region, time and distance would be as great an enemy as the adversary itself. Assuming a speed of 22 knots, a ship like the LHA 6, home-ported in San Diego, would take nine days to get to Tokyo, 12 days to get to Taiwan, and 13 days to get to the South China Sea. This is a slow response time to what might be a very rapid conflict. Indeed, it is dangerous to assume that the United States will have an unambiguous and timely warning of any conflict in the region.

In sum, then: Does the loss of the VFA fundamentally degrade U.S. operations in the region? No. But could it be the first step towards that end result? Yes. This is why ensuring a U.S. soldier can train her counterpart in Manila without a visa also ensures she can also come to the defense of a U.S. treaty ally. Maintaining these alliances in the Indo-Pacific in all their manifestations is critical—and the details matter.

#### War in the South China Sea goes nuclear

Helmy ‘22 (Nadia Helmy is associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics at Beni Suef University in Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs, she’s Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) at Lund University in Sweden. She’s also Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit. “Future scenarios about a potential U.S. -China nuclear war in Taiwan and South China Sea,” Modern Diplomacy, 4/15/22, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/04/15/future-scenarios-about-a-potential-u-s-china-nuclear-war-in-taiwan-and-south-china-sea/>)-Alex

Chinese military analyzes also confirm that the war between China and the United States of America near the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea is likely to turn into a nuclear war, emphasizing that in order to change the course of the war for the losing or defeated party, the party that will lose its war with  The other, may have to compensate for his loss and defeat, by displaying his nuclear power and tactical nuclear weapons to strike the winning side, by using several (tactical nuclear weapons, that is, using a number of warheads of limited power, but they can accurately destroy military targets).

In the event that China succeeds in paralyzing and obstructing the American military force near the areas of direct Chinese influence, Washington may respond to China to save its face in front of its people and other international and regional powers to save Taiwan, for fear of an invasion by China, through the possibility of (the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States of America against China’s ports, airports, sea and air fleets). This is not just a baseless analysis without real indications of it, as the US armed forces are currently developing nuclear weapons to deter China primarily in Taiwan and the South China Sea in the event of a war between them, through the development of Washington for the “cruise missile” program with nuclear warheads to be (launched by US nuclear submarines located near the areas of direct Chinese influence), the US military and its forces in the Indo-Pacific region could use these nuclear weapons, near China, to achieve an American nuclear military victory over China.

 According to my analysis of the US-Chinese military scene, according to the indicators of nuclear power between them, I can understand that (the outbreak of a war between Washington and Beijing, may turn into a conflict in the region neighboring China in East and Southeast Asia as a whole, especially with the support of Washington’s allies after Washington signed “Quad Quartet Agreement” with Australia, Japan, and India. Besides, the “Aukus Military Defense Nuclear Submarine Agreement” between Washington, Australia and Britain). Thus, any US-Chinese conflict is likely to spread across many regions on several Asian fronts, and here either China or the United States of America may use their nuclear weapons to snatch victory when losing the war front.

### Philippines --- Russia Draw-in

#### Russia is invested in the South China Sea

Le Thu & Cao, ’19 (Huong Le Thu is a principal fellow at Perth USAsia Center, is advisor for Asia-Pacific development, diplomacy & defence dialogue at Canberra, is on the board of advisors for the Griffith Asia Institute and is a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Sunny Cao is a senior assistant at Deloitte. “Russia’s growing interests in the South China Sea,” The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 12/18/19, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russias-growing-interests-in-the-south-china-sea/>) -Alex

Rosneft, which is half-owned by the Russian government, is no stranger to the South China Sea. It [became](https://block061.rosneft.com/about/Rosneft_today/Operational_structure/Development_and_Production/Block061/) an operator of a joint project for gas production and exploration in Block 06.1 in the Nam Con Son Basin, off the coast of Vietnam, back in 2013. Since 2018, it has also been working with Vietnam to expand gas development projects in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, including [drilling](https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/ignoring-china-vietnam-extends-offshore-drilling-campaign) two new wells in the area. Russia’s presence in the South China Sea complicates the ongoing disputes between China and its neighbours over competing territorial claims. If the Philippines engages in joint exploration with Rosneft, Russia could start to play a wider role in the region. Russia has also been a key long-term defence partner for Vietnam, both strategically and militarily. The two nations [signed](https://tass.com/defense/997801) a defence cooperation agreement covering 2018–2020 last year, and [agreed](https://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/external-relations/item/7812302-vietnam-russia-foster-defence-cooperation.html) to enhance defence cooperation during 2019–2023. Russia and Vietnam also [elevated](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/16064) their bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. Vietnam is the only claimant that has been consistently vocal in its opposition to China’s activities in the South China Sea. Events this year—specifically, [the stand-off at Vanguard Bank](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-incursion-into-vietnams-eez-and-lessons-from-the-past/) in which Vietnamese and Chinese coastguard vessels were involved in a confrontation over the presence of a Chinese survey vessel in waters Vietnam controls—illustrate the territory-related tensions in China–Vietnam relations. But despite Moscow’s claim that it will not get involved in territorial disputes, by continuing to work with Vietnam through Rosneft it is expressing support for Hanoi. If Rosneft remains undeterred by China’s attempts at coercion, it may set an example for other international commercial oil companies to engage in joint operations in this disputed body of water.

#### War in the SCS spills out.

Stavridis, 21 (James Stavris is a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is the author most recently of "To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision." “Four Ways a China-U.S. War at Sea Could Play Out,” Bloomberg, 4/25/21, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-25/u-s-china-sea-war-could-spread-to-japan-australia-india>) -Alex

Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint, but combat could stretch out as far as the Indian Ocean.

I see four distinct maritime “flashpoint” zones, where the Chinese navy may potentially take military against the U.S. and its allies, partners and friends. They are the Taiwan Strait; Japan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and more distant waters around China's other neighbors, including Indonesia, Singapore, Australia and India.

The highest regional priority for the Chinese military is ensuring it can exercise sea control and power projection in the waters around Taiwan. President Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership have sworn to bring the [“renegade province”](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55851052) to heel. While they still hope to do so through patience — and by strangling Taipei’s [international support](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-14/beijing-is-out-to-convince-the-world-that-taiwan-is-not-worth-dying-for) — they will be willing to use military force if necessary. In recent congressional [testimony](https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years), Admiral Phil Davidson, head of the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Command, said that he saw the possibility of military action “within six years.”

With Taiwan over 8,000 miles from Hawaii but around 100 miles from the Chinese mainland, the challenges for the U.S. Navy are profound. U.S. support for Taiwan’s security is bipartisan — but the longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity,” supporting Taiwan militarily without a formal commitment to defending it, is dangerously fuzzy. It could lead to a miscalculation by the Chinese (or the Taiwanese) and set off a larger conflict.

China and Japan both claim a group of islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku in Japanese and the Diaoyu in Chinese. Located close to Taiwan, these five uninhabited islands are important because ownership provides a 200-nautical-mile exclusion zone and buttresses competing claims around them. They are part of the chain descending south from the Japanese main islands, and form a gateway to the South China Sea. Ownership would also provide fishing rights, access to exploit [hydrocarbons](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/08/19/china-is-probing-japans-aerial-defenses-over-the-disputed-senkaku-islands/?sh=6be0e20a7dab), and the possibility of deep-seabed mining.

The U.S. recognizes the islands as part of Japan, thus a Chinese move to occupy them would activate the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty, something successive American [presidential administrations](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf) have made clear.

Alongside all those maritime silhouettes, you will also see the warships of many nations — China and the U.S., to be sure, but also local combatants from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. Other Asia-Pacific nations, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India and South Korea, maintain a military presence. And warships from other side of the world — France, Germany, the U.K. — routinely deploy there as well.

Today, India is cornerstone of an emerging Indo-Pacific geopolitical alignment, known as colloquially as [the Quad](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-19/indo-pacific-quad-alliance-must-do-more-than-balance-china), along with Australia, Japan and the U.S. One of Biden’s first actions after taking office was a video summit with the other three nations’ leaders.

If so, how would India respond? While not treaty allies, Washington and New Delhi are drawing closer together. India’s relations with China are deteriorating, with recent clashes over disputed Himalayan borders. If India were to join with the other Quad nations, it would mean war at sea in the Indian Ocean.

### Philippines --- Bases Deter

#### Bases Deter – empirics

Change 4-4 (Felix K. Chang, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Operating Officer of Decision, a predictive analytics company, and an assistant professor at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. ‘Strategies Behind China and the Asia-Pacific’s Military Base Construction’, FPRI, April 14, 2022, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/strategies-behind-china-and-the-asia-pacifics-military-base-construction/)

At the turn of the new millennium, [most Asia-Pacific countries had hoped that codes of conduct](https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/10/uncertain-prospects-south-china-sea-code-of-conduct-negotiations/), greater trade, and tighter economic integration would obviate China’s motivation to build or expand its military bases. That has not turned out to be the case. Thus, one by one, countries across the Asia-Pacific have come to reassess their needs for military bases. The types of bases built since the late 2000s signal three distinct strategies. First is a strategy of limited deterrence, the intent of which is to prevent Chinese forces from operating with complete impunity, rather than to thwart them. Vietnam was the first to employ this approach.In the late 2000s, it overhauled its Cam Ranh Bay naval base. It then offered the use of the base’s modernized facilities to foreign navies, including those of India, Japan, and the United States. By the late 2010s, it had become home to the backbone of the Vietnamese navy: six new Project 636.3 (Kilo-class) diesel-electric attack submarines. Malaysia followed by building a new naval base for its two Scorpene-class diesel-electric attack submarines at Sepanggar Bay on Borneo, near the South China Sea, in 2008. A half decade later, Kuala Lumpur built a second naval base at Bintulu, also on Borneo, to monitor China’s growing maritime presence off its coast. Malaysia expanded the base with an airfield in 2022. Getting off to a later start were Indonesia and the Philippines. It was not until 2014 that Jakarta expanded its Pontianak naval base on Borneo. Then in 2021, after lengthy preparations, Jakarta broke ground on a new base on Natuna Island for three of its planned diesel-electric attack submarines. Similarly, Manila began to expand its naval facilities at Oyster Bay on Palawan Island, adjacent to the South China Sea, in 2014. Six years later, it selected a site at Subic Bay on Luzon Island for a new base that will house [its revitalized navy](https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/building-from-scratch-rebirth-of-the-philippine-navy/), including two or three planned diesel-electric attack submarines. It also expects to construct an air base nearby for its new F/A-50 jet fighter-trainers. And, since the mid-2010s, Vietnam has built, and the Philippines will soon build, bases for mobile anti-ship missile batteries along their respective South China Sea coasts**.** The bases will enable the two countries to project modern firepower into the disputed region.To the north, Japan began building new military bases at about the same time. But unlike the strategy behind Southeast Asia’s bases, Japan’s bases suggested a strategy whose intention was to not only fully deter China from seizing the Senkaku Islands, but also frustrate China’s wider naval ambitions. In 2014, Tokyo set up a coastal observation base on Yonaguni Island, near the disputed islands. Soon after, it began preparations to construct [new bases with anti-ship missile batteries on several Ryukyu Islands](https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/02/the-ryukyu-defense-line-japans-response-to-chinas-naval-push-into-the-pacific-ocean/), which run from the Japanese mainland to Yonaguni Island. The first base was built on Amami Ōshima Island. It was armed with a Type 12 anti-ship missile battery and defended by a Type 03 surface-to-air missile battery. Tokyo then built similar bases on Miyako Island in 2020 and Ishigaki Island in 2022. The missile bases cover the disputed Senkaku Islands as well as all the transit points for the Chinese navy into the Pacific Ocean, including the Miyako Strait. Finally, further out into the Pacific Ocean, the United States has started to seriously reconsider its basing requirements. Having pulled back much of its forces in Asia (including those in South Korea) to military bases on Okinawa and mainland Japan after the Cold War, Washington grew increasingly worried about their safety from Chinese ballistic missile attack during the 2010s.[[4]](https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/strategies-behind-china-and-the-asia-pacifics-military-base-construction/" \l "_ftn4) Indeed, with the advent of new Chinese intermediate-range missiles, American military bases on Guam seem vulnerable too. Hence, the United States has been gradually shifting from a strategy of forward deployment to one of dispersion and redundancy. In 2018, Washington arranged a more-or-less permanent American presence in Darwin at the northern tip of Australia. Then, in 2020, the United States opened negotiations with a welcoming Palau for a possible new base there. And, given America’s need to secure its sea lanes of communications across the Pacific Ocean, it was no surprise that it also decided to reopen its embassy in the Solomon Islands in 2022.

### Philippines --- AT: Deterrence Fails

#### China will move onto the South China Sea if it perceives the US as being weak there

Kaplan, ’14 (Robert Kaplan graduated with a B.A. in political science from University of Washington in 1966. He’s a lawyer in Seattle who has served on numerous nonprofit boards and community organizations. In ’96, he was recognized by the American Bar Association for his pro-bono work. “Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific,” Random House, 03/25/14, pg. 27-30)

“Plan B is the U.S. Navy—Pacific Command. But we will publicly remain neutral in any U.S.-China dispute.” To make certain that I got the message, this official said: “An American military presence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.” The withdrawal of even one U.S. aircraft carrier strike group from the Western Pacific is a “game changer.”

China, by way of its 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles focused on Taiwan and its 270 commercial flights a week to Taiwan, will be able to do an end run around Taiwanese sovereignty without needing to subdue it through a naval invasion. As with the closing of the American frontier, China’s effective capture of Taiwan in the years to come will allow Chinese naval planners the ability to finally concentrate their energies on the wider South China Sea, an antechamber to the Indian Ocean in which China also desires a naval presence, in order to protect its Middle Eastern energy supplies. Were China to ever replace the U.S. Navy as the dominant power in the South China Sea— or even reach parity with it—this would open up geostrategic possibilities for China comparable to what America achieved upon its dominance of the Caribbean.

The U.S. Navy presently dominates the South China Sea. But that situation will change. The size of the U.S. Navy has come down from almost six hundred warships in the Reagan era, to the mid-three hundreds during the Clinton era, to under three hundred now. It might go lower still by the 2020s, because of the retirement of current classes of submarines and surface warships, cost overruns, and future budget cuts, the result in turn of massive fiscal deficits. Meanwhile, the Chinese navy, the world’s second most powerful naval service, is growing rather dramatically. Rather than purchase warships across the board, China is developing niche capacities in subsurface warfare and ballistic missile technology (the DF-21 missile) designed to hit moving targets at sea, such as a U.S. aircraft carrier. If China expands its submarine fleet to 78 by 2020 as planned, it will be on par with the U.S. Navy’s undersea fleet in quantity. 12 While the U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet is completely nuclear, it requires that feature to sail halfway around the world, in order to get to East Asia in the first place, even as China’s diesel-electric submarines are supremely quiet and can hide better, therefore, in the congested littorals of East Asia. At some point, China is likely to, in effect, be able to deny the U.S. Navy unimpeded access to parts of the South China Sea.

#### U.S. presence in the SCS prevents Chinese aggression

Krepinevich, ’15 (Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich is president and chief operating officer of Solarium, a defense consulting firm. He’s served in the DOD, and he currently serves as chairman of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel and on the Advisory Council of Business Executives for National Security. Dr. Krepinevich has taught on the faculties of West Point, George Mason University, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University. He has an M.P.A. and Ph D. from Harvard.

These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing’s expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as “the first island chain,” encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington’s ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington’s goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force.

Leveraging the latent potential of U.S., allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the first island chain—an “Archipelagic Defense”—and, in so doing, deny Beijing the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.

#### Philippines shifting towards deterrence of China – US support key.

Javier 22(Erick Neilson C Javier, research officer at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). The views expressed in this article are his alone, and do not represent the views of the NDCP, the Department of National Defense, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or the Philippine Government, ‘Rethinking the Philippines’ Deterrence in the South China Sea’, MHT Corporation, March 26, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/rethinking-the-philippines-deterrence-in-the-south-china-sea/>)

Manila should change the narrative from a focus on “how to defend” against China toward a more active strategy of deterring China. This is not mere semantics, but a change of mindset in how the Philippines frames its defense and security policies. The former concedes all initiative to China and puts the Philippines in a position where it may be forced to compromise on its interests. This was demonstrated by [Chinese aggression against Philippine vessels](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/811345/2-philippine-boats-en-route-to-ayungin-blocked-water-cannoned-by-chinese-ships-locsin/story/) attempting to resupply Philippine troops in Second Thomas Shoal in November 2021. Resupply eventually resumed, but with the [conditionality of Philippine forces not escorting future supply runs](https://globalnation.inquirer.net/200487/ph-to-resume-resupply-missions-to-ayungin-shoal-outpost-lorenzanaph-to-resume-resupply-missions-to-ayungin-shoal-outpost-lorenzana). Short-term relief for the shoal may have been bought at the cost of long-term risk, should Chinese forces again block resupply to the Philippine outpost. Chinese military vessels continue to test Philippine sovereignty over even internal archipelagic waters, with the most recent [incident occurring in the Sulu Sea](https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements-and-advisoriesupdate/30231-statement-dfa-summons-chinese-ambassador-for-pla-navy-vessel-s-illegal-intrusion-and-lingering-presence-in-philippine-archipelagic-waters) on March 14, 2022. A more active strategy of deterrence posits that the Philippines can influence Chinese decision-making, if not compelling Beijing to renounce its claims, then at least pushing it to reconsider its gray zone operations and other forms of aggression.The urgency for improving the Philippines’ posture has only increased since the Whitsun Reef incident, as [negotiations for a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea have gone nowhere](https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/12/14/21/locsin-south-china-sea-coc-talks-went-nowhere) due to the Chinese insistence on excluding other extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, as part of the CoC’s provisions. In conceptualizing deterrence, Manila must be able to explain how and why planned military capabilities affect the adversary’s decision-making. Developing a [theory of victory](https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/on-the-need-for-a-blue-theory-of-victory/), particularly for the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea, can be crucial in this task. A “theory of victory” comprises coherent ideas that guide the Philippines in utilizing its defense resources to achieve the desired conditions, whether that is preserving Philippine holdings in the disputed sea, deterring coercive actions against Philippine vessels and citizens in the waters of the West Philippine Sea, or compelling and/or incentivizing Chinese recognition of and compliance to the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award. In crafting a theory of victory, Manila must conduct a thorough appraisal of the likely adversary, accounting for their unique [strategic culture](https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/how-china-sees-the-international-order-a-lesson-from-the-chinese-classics/), [grand project](https://chuangcn.org/journal/two/an-adequate-state/), and exercise of military and [non-military](https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Political%20Warfare_web.pdf) coercion. The theory must also include considerations of the Philippines’ allies, including their limitations and situations where they may not be able to extend aid. A theory of victory gives intellectual foundations to devise Philippine deterrence concepts and objectives, generating more policy options for Manila to respond to current and future aggression. This can support AFP modernization efforts either by reinforcing or re-examining the logic to procure [systems such as submarines](https://www.stratforumph.com/post/the-submarine-acquisition-project-of-the-philippines) and [ground-based anti-ship cruise missiles](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-brahmos-missile-system-and-the-philippines-quest-for-deterrence/). Developing a theory of victory can show that the Philippines is purposeful in preparing for long-term defense of its interests, reducing the impact of defeatist and [pro-adversary narratives](https://idsicenter.com/new-worlds/most-powerful-antidote-to-corruption-authoritarianism-and-other-excuses/) that aim to sow confusion and doubt in the country’s resolve.

### Philippines –- Impact Uniqueness

#### Risk of conflict in the SCS high now.

Buddhavarapu ’22 (Ravi Buddhavarapu is a reporter for CNBC.com based in Singapore. “South China Sea faces higher risk of conflict as arms race builds up, says weapons expert” CNBC, April 26 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/27/south-china-sea-region-at-a-higher-risk-for-conflict-weapons-expert.html)

The South China Sea region faces a heightened risk of conflict as it arms itself at an “alarming rate,” an expert from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute told CNBC on Monday. It comes as worldwide military spending surpassed $2 trillion for the first time ever in 2021, he added. “The region is arming at an alarming rate. Countries are playing with each other in terms of action-reaction, where when one country increases [purchases], another country [also] increases, procuring more weapons,” Nan Tian, a senior researcher in military expenditure at SIPRI, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia.” Tian said China’s increased military spending has created a “greater threat perception” in the neighborhood. This has “led to these neighboring countries such as Singapore, Japan, Australia and Taiwan purchasing a lot of new technologies, such as nuclear submarines and precision missile systems,” he said. In response to China’s growing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, its neighbors have purchased several U.S weapon systems over the past decade. Earlier in April, the U.S. approved the sale of up to $95 million worth of training and equipment to support Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense system developed by Raytheon. It’s the third arms sale to Taiwan under the Biden administration. In 2020, the U.S. approved a $23 billion order by Japan for a large number of F-35 fighter aircraft manufactured by Lockheed Martin. Northrop Grumman also delivered Global Hawk UAVs to Japan earlier this year. And Singapore has placed orders for F-35 fighters expected to be delivered in 2026. Some of these U.S. defense stocks have surged since the start of Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine. Raytheon shares are 5% higher since Feb. 24, while Lockheed Martin stocks are up around 12% and Northrop Grumman is higher by around 11%. In comparison, the S&P 500 index is down over 2% in the same period. Tian also referred to the threat North Korea poses to the region and the world. “North Korea is testing and developing nuclear weapons, which of course is a greater concern to not only the region but the world as a whole,” he said. Tian said a large amount of financial resources are being allocated to the militaries of the South China Sea region, making a miscalculation possible. “A miscalculation could have severe consequences, given the amount of weapons being procured and the amount of financial resources being allocated to the region’s militaries to increase capabilities,” he said.

#### China pursuing naval dominance in the SCS now.

AP ’22 (The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business.” “China accuses the U.S. of trying to hijack support in Asia”, National Public Radio, June 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/12/1104414204/china-accuses-us-of-trying-to-hijack-support-in-asia)

China's defense minister accused the United States on Sunday of trying to "hijack" the support of countries in the Asia-Pacific region to turn them against Beijing, saying Washington is seeking to advance its own interests "under the guise of multilateralism." Defense Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe lashed out at U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, rejecting his "smearing accusation" the day before at the Shangri-La Dialogue that China was causing instability with its claim to the self-governing island of Taiwan and its increased military activity in the area. Austin had stressed the need for multilateral partnerships with nations in the Indo-Pacific, which Wei suggested was an attempt to back China into a corner. "No country should impose its will on others or bully others under the guise of multilateralism," he said. " The strategy is an attempt to build an exclusive small group in the name of a free and open Indo-Pacific to hijack countries in our region and target one specific country — it is a strategy to create conflict and confrontation to contain and encircle others." China has been rapidly modernizing its military and seeking to expand its influence and ambitions in the region, recently signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands that many fear could lead to a Chinese naval base in the Pacific, and breaking ground this past week on a naval port expansion project in Cambodia that could give Beijing a foothold in the Gulf of Thailand. Last year U.S. officials accused China of testing a hypersonic missile, a weapon harder for missile defense systems to counter, but China insisted it had been a "routine test of a spacecraft." Answering a question about the test on Sunday, Wei came the closest so far to acknowledging it was, indeed, a hypersonic missile, saying, "As for hypersonic weapons, many countries are developing weapons and I think there's no surprise that China is doing so." "China will develop its military," he added. "I think it's natural." U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last month said China represented the "most serious long-term challenge to the international order" for the United States, with its claims to Taiwan and efforts to dominate the strategic South China Sea. The U.S. and its allies have responded with so-called freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, sometimes encountering a pushback from China's military.

### Philippines Impact --- More

#### War in South China Sea has massive impacts

Heydarian, ’21 (Richard Javad Heydarian is a professorial chairholder in geopolitics at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, and author of, among others, “The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery” [Palgrave Macmillan] and the forthcoming “China’s New Empire” [Melbourne University Press]. “Will the South China Sea Spark the Next Global Conflict?” The Diplomat, 06/01/22, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/will-the-south-china-sea-spark-the-next-global-conflict/>)-Alex

In Asia’s maritime heartland, all the ingredients of a global cataclysm are conspiring against the post-Cold War period of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In many ways, the South China Sea disputes are today’s version of the early 20th century Balkans, where “some damned foolish thing” can trigger a devastating global conflict without precedence and beyond our wildest imagination. It is here in Asia’s maritime heartland, where all the ingredients of a global cataclysm are conspiring against the post-Cold War period of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. It’s also here where the naked edge of China’s hegemonic ambitions are on full display, with dire consequences for smaller neighbors and the broader liberal international order. Here lies the defining geopolitical dilemma of our times.

Today’s China is too big to be “contained,” a la George F. Kennan’s antidote to the Soviet threat, but it’s also becoming too voracious to be left to its own devices. If there is one thing that history teaches us, it is that neither strategic fatalism, which would risk turning the South China Sea into a Chinse lake, nor a reckless superpower rivalry, which could spark a global conflict, is advisable. So, how should we deal with the most powerful communist regime of all time? Or, as Vladimir Lenin once put it, “What is to be done?”

To prevent China’s prospective domination of a main artery of global trade, what’s necessary is nothing less than a multilateral “Goldilocks” approach, which checks Beijing’s worst instincts through an optimal combination of engagement and deterrence. Here, what is needed is a “constrainment” strategy, whereby like-minded powers and China’s besieged neighbors should collectively deploy a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military countermeasures to uphold a free and open order in the world’s most dynamic region.

#### The South China Sea is volatile

Buddhavarapu, 22 (Ravi Buddhavarapu has worked in journalism for decades, creating his own agency in Singapore. He was a political correspondent in India, and now works as a reporter in the digital arm of CNBC. “South China Sea faces higher risk of conflict as arms race builds up, says weapons expert,” CNBC, 4/26/22, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/27/south-china-sea-region-at-a-higher-risk-for-conflict-weapons-expert.html>) -Alex

“The region is arming at an alarming rate. Countries are playing with each other in terms of action-reaction, where when one country increases [purchases], another country [also] increases, procuring more weapons,” Nan Tian, a senior researcher in military expenditure at SIPRI, told CNBC.

Tian said China’s increased military spending has created a “greater threat perception” in the neighborhood. This has “led to these neighboring countries such as Singapore, Japan, Australia and Taiwan purchasing a lot of new technologies, such as nuclear submarines and precision missile systems,” he said.

Tian said a large amount of financial resources are being allocated to the militaries of the South China Sea region, making a miscalculation possible. “A miscalculation could have severe consequences, given the amount of weapons being procured and the amount of financial resources being allocated to the region’s militaries to increase capabilities,” he said.

Tian said it is important to extend the non-proliferation regime to conventional weapons as well. “It is important that institutions such as the U.N. bring in member states and agree on essential non- Tian said it is important to extend the non-proliferation regime to conventional weapons as well. “It is important that institutions such as the U.N. bring in member states and agree on essential non-proliferation of not only nuclear but also conventional weapons. So that these increases in military spending do not get out of hand, increasing potential risks of armed conflict,” he said.

# Aff

## AT: Uniqueness

### 2AC --- Pivot Fails

#### US is losing to China now – pivot fail inevitable – structural problems unrelated to the AFF.

Townshend and Crabtree ’22 (Mr. Townshend is a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Crabtree is executive director of the Asia office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The U.S. Is Losing Its Military Edge in Asia, and China Knows It”, New York Times, June 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/opinion/international-world/us-military-china-asia.html)

As China’s armed forces grow in strength, sophistication and confidence, U.S.-led military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is losing its bite. Take the United States’ military presence in the region. It has about 55,000 military personnel in Japan and 28,000 in South Korea. Several thousand more are deployed across Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Guam. This posture has barely changed since the 1950s. But plans to reinvigorate the U.S. presence have been stymied by inadequate budgets, competing priorities and a lack of consensus in Washington on how to deal with China. The Pentagon has increased investments in cutting-edge technologies like artificial intelligence, and cyber- and space-based systems to prepare for a possible high-tech conflict with China in the 2030s. But the balance of power is likely to shift decidedly in China’s favor by the time they are deployed unless the United States brings new resources to the table soon. President Biden this year submitted the largest defense budget ever in dollar terms, but much of the increase will be swallowed up by skyrocketing inflation. Mr. Biden, like former President Donald Trump, is thus falling short of a target of 3 percent to 5 percent real annual budget growth, a bipartisan goal set even before the Ukraine war and often cited as the minimum the Pentagon needs in today’s era of great-power competition. While the U.S. military is globally dispersed, China can concentrate its forces on winning a future conflict in its own neighborhood. It now has the capability. China has the world’s largest navy and Asia’s biggest air force and an imposing arsenal of missiles designed to deter the United States from projecting military power into the Western Pacific in a crisis. China’s third and most advanced aircraft carrier is nearing completion, and other new hardware is being developed or is already in service. Beijing is also raising alarm with its readiness to project that strength. While much attention is focused on its behavior toward Taiwan, China is building and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea. It also broke ground on an expanded naval port in Cambodia last week, which may one day provide its first military foothold in another Asian country. A security agreement with the Solomon Islands could lead to something similar, and Beijing is aggressively courting other Pacific nations. America’s military position in Asia, by contrast, has been hampered by decades of preoccupation with Middle East conflicts. The war in Ukraine has morphed into a long-term $54 billion commitment and forced Mr. Biden to delay and redraft his administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy — critical documents that lay out global priorities and resource needs — as officials grapple with how to manage China and Russia at the same time. Mr. Biden’s team ended the lengthy and costly U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, but that has not freed up many resources for the Indo-Pacific. Washington must not lose sight of the fact that China is a far greater security threat than Russia, now and in the long term.

## AT: Link

### 2AC --- NATO Counterbalance --- China Prioritization

#### NATO focusing on China now – no tradeoff

Wilson, Lawless, and Corbet 6-28 (The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business.” NATO pivots to highlight Chinese ‘challenges’ for 1st time”, The Associated Press, June 28, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-taiwan-jens-stoltenberg-ab60b2843268edde1ec29c43d421a26f>)

NATO has for the first time singled out China as one of its strategic priorities for the next decade, warning about its growing military ambitions, confrontational rhetoric toward Taiwan and other neighbors, and increasingly close ties to Russia. While Russia’s war against Ukraine has dominated discussions at the NATO summit, China earned a place Wednesday among the Western alliance’s most worrying security concerns. “China is substantially building up its military forces, including nuclear weapons, bullying its neighbors, threatening Taiwan ... monitoring and controlling its own citizens through advanced technology, and spreading Russian lies and disinformation,” Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said after presenting NATO’s ten-year Strategic Concept. “China is not our adversary,” Stoltenberg said, “but we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents.” The strategic document directed its harshest language at Russia, but the mere mention of China was significant; the 2010 document did not discuss China. The official turn by NATO puts the world’s largest military alliance based on the United States armed forces on guard against China, which has the world’s second-largest economy and a rapidly growing military, both in numbers and in top-notch technology. “One of the things that (China’s) doing is seeking to undermine the rules-based international order that we adhere to, that we believe in, that we helped build,” said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. “And if China’s challenging it in one way or another, we will stand up to that.” China has yet to condemn Russia’s four-month long war against Ukraine and has criticized sanctions brought against Moscow by NATO members. A year ago, Russia and China extended a friendship treaty promising even more “strategic cooperation” in defending their common interests. That was followed up in November with an agreement to strengthen their military ties. Weeks before Russia’s February invasion, Chinese leader Xi Jinping hosted his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin for a summit at which they pledged a partnership that had “no limits.” Western leaders are concerned that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine could embolden China to be more assertive over Taiwan. China considers Taiwan a part of its territory with no right to independent recognition as a state or representation on the world stage. Speaking at an event in Madrid that was not part of the NATO summit, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said that unless China is checked “there is a real risk that they draw the wrong idea which results in a catastrophic miscalculation such as invading Taiwan,” referring to the self-governing island that China claims as a province. However, in a move interpreted to show it was somewhat uneasy over the war in Ukraine, China voted to abstain in a United Nations motion to demand Russia halt its attack. China has greatly increased its diplomatic reach via foreign investment, above all in central Asia and Africa. Now it is seeking to match that with greater military might, especially in the South China Sea where it has built bases on disputed islands. The U.S. navy has pushed back by conducting drills in those waters.

### 2AC --- No Link --- No Tradeoff

#### The U.S. can split resources between Europe and Asia

Brumstrom & Martina, ‘22 (David Brumstrom is correspondent on U.S. Asia Policy for Reuters. He’s been reporting for four decades. Michael Martina is a graduate of Tshinga University, University of Florida and University of Washington. Now, he works as a political correspondent at Reuters. “U.S. can focus on two theaters - Indo-Pacific and war in Europe, official says,” Reuters, 2/28/22, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-can-focus-two-theaters-indo-pacific-war-europe-official-says-2022-02-28/>) -Alex

WASHINGTON, Feb 28 (Reuters) - The United States will keep its focus on the Indo-Pacific despite the Ukraine crisis, the White House Indo-Pacific policy coordinator said on Monday, adding Washington has been deeply engaged in two theaters simultaneously before, including during World War Two and the Cold War. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a director for U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy at the White House National Security Council, said she was confident that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not divert from U.S. Indo-Pacific goals. "There is a way that the resources we are sending to Ukraine right now are actually quite distinct from what we are trying to do on the Indo Pacific strategy," she said. "That does not mean that we won’t feel moments of resource scarcity, but it does mean that we can plan both simultaneously."

#### No Tradeoff between Europe and Asia

Baker and Kanno-Youngs ’22 (Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. He also is the author of six books, most recently " Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House, including homeland security and extremism. He joined The Times in 2019 as the homeland security correspondent.” “Biden Begins Trip to Asia Meant to Reassure Allies of Focus on China”, Th eNew York Times, May 19 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/us/politics/biden-trip-asia.html)

President Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia since taking office, hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China, even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe. With his original strategy of pivoting foreign policy attention to Asia effectively blown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off between Europe and Asia and that only the United States can bring together the democracies of the East and West to stand up to autocracy and aggression in both spheres. For Mr. Biden, finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president. The competing demands on his time and attention were on display on Thursday as he squeezed in a last-minute meeting at the White House with the leaders of Sweden and Finland to welcome their decisions to join NATO before heading to Joint Base Andrews to board Air Force One for the long flight to South Korea. And days before that, Mr. Biden hosted Southeast Asian nations at the White House to detail new investments in clean energy and maritime assets, part of an effort to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific. “We are preparing for all contingencies, including the possibility that such a provocation would occur while we are in Korea or in Japan,” Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, told reporters this week before Mr. Biden departed Washington. Mr. Sullivan has consulted his counterpart in China in recent days to discuss, among other things, the prospect of a North Korean provocation. Mr. Biden’s trip is also aimed at reassuring allies in the region who were rattled by President Donald J. Trump’s unorthodox approach to Asia in recent years. Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an American-negotiated regional trade pact meant to counter China’s growing economic sway. He repeatedly questioned American troop commitments to South Korea and the mutual defense agreement with Japan, while engaging in what he called a “love affair” with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Bruce Klingner, a longtime C.I.A. analyst on Asia now at the Heritage Foundation, said South Korea and Japan were increasingly nervous about North Korea’s capabilities and Mr. Trump’s threats to pull back from the region. “Biden should provide unequivocal assurances of U.S. dedication to the defense of our allies and affirm the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee of nuclear, conventional and missile defense forces,” he said. A couple of recent studies have concluded that even though American political influence in the region has risen again with Mr. Trump leaving power, the United States has continued to lose economic influence because of the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. “The biggest criticism of the administration in Asia right now is they have no economic strategy and they’re ceding the field to China,” said Michael J. Green, the incoming chief executive of the United States Studies Centre in Australia and a former Asia adviser to President George W. Bush. To address that, Mr. Biden plans to unveil a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which is a pale shadow of a full-scale trade pact but will outline various mutual priorities like digital trade and supply chain security. American officials hope it will be joined by many of the countries still in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Mr. Green called that an important first step but one that behind the scenes, the Japanese, Australians and others find inadequate for the moment — although they are unlikely to say so publicly. “A lot of their interest is to show the U.S. is back and China is not going to write the economic rules,” Mr. Green said. Matthew P. Goodman, senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that if the Biden administration did not offer greater access to the American market, nations in the region would be looking for direct funding to expand infrastructure and the digital economy. “I think a lot of partners are going to look at that list and say: That’s a good list of issues. I’m happy to be involved,” said Mr. Goodman. “But, you know, are we going to get any tangible benefits out of participating in this framework?” In crafting the economic framework, Biden administration officials have focused in part on labor and environmental standards. But without the benefits of lowered trade barriers, other countries may be reluctant to make costly commitments. “The bottom line is the United States is not coming to the table with market access,” said Sheila A. Smith, a senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “And that’s the trade piece. That’s what the region is looking for.” During stops in Seoul and Tokyo, Mr. Biden will encounter two new partners who are both seen as more aligned with American priorities and likely to have good chemistry with the president, according to Mr. Green and other analysts and officials. The first, President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea, was inaugurated on May 10 and has taken a stronger approach to China and North Korea than his predecessor, while the second, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, was elected just last October and enjoys a level of popularity that is likely to keep him in office for the duration of Mr. Biden’s term, unlike the frequent revolving-door governments in Tokyo. “Inevitably North Korea is going to make itself front and center as part of the agenda for a Biden-Yoon summit,” said Scott A. Snyder, the director of U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Just the fact that that speculation is out there makes it necessary for the two leaders to talk about extended deterrence, how that works, and to try to deepen their shared commitment to security and defense.” While in Tokyo, Mr. Biden will also meet with other leaders of the so-called Quad — the United States, Japan, Australia and India — his second time sitting down with his counterparts in a bloc meant to resist Chinese hegemony in the region. With Australian elections scheduled for Saturday, it remained unclear who would attend the meeting, on Tuesday. But the most complicating factor may be how Mr. Biden approaches Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, who has been hesitant to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine out of fear of undermining security ties with Moscow. Moreover, Mr. Biden’s promise to combat autocracies around the world will be put to the test with Mr. Modi, who has marginalized and maligned minority Muslims. But the president’s aides said he can press the international campaign to thwart Russian aggression while still navigating the diplomatic complexities of the Asian-Pacific region and reaffirming America’s role in this part of the world. “He remains focused on ensuring that our efforts in those missions are successful,” said Mr. Sullivan, “but he also intends to seize this moment, this pivotal moment, to assert bold and confident American leadership in another vital region of the world.”

## AT: Impact

### 2AC --- Taiwan --- Invasion Inevitable

#### China invades Taiwan – cannot be deterred.

Saxty, ’22 (Jonathan Saxty is assistant editor of Brexit Watch, and writes for journals like the Telegraph, the Express and The Spectator. “Make no mistake China WILL invade Taiwan – and the world will be at war – JONATHAN SAXTY,” The Express, 4/25/22, <https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/1615688/China-Taiwan-invasion-US-Joe-Biden-military-Japan>) -Alex

To be clear, the CCP is absolutely committed to what it sees as retaking Taiwan. The leadership in Beijing has said so again and again, and to not do so could risk an incalculable loss of face. Don’t think that war in Ukraine has put China off. Chinese state media has not stopped telling the people how well it has been going for Russia – a policy likely to embolden Chinese public demands to invade Taiwan. Taiwan may well present difficulties but the island is still 16-times smaller than Ukraine and could be more easily blockaded to prevent supplies from getting in. Lose Taiwan to China and the US could lose the Western Pacific. Lose the Western Pacific - and apart from the huge loss of credibility among Asia-Pacific allies like Australia and Japan, and all the implications for them – and the US has lost its role as guarantor of the sea lanes, a huge component of the dominance of the dollar, a crown jewel of US economic might. Sticking with economics, any hopes the US has of ‘decoupling’ from China would take an enormous hit if Taiwan fell, given its outsized role in the semiconductor industry. Ending overreliance on Taiwan is not an overnight task either, any more than moving manufacturing away from China would be. There is a purpose behind this. China wants Taiwan, and unlike Russia over Ukraine, has made this crystal clear.

#### China is at its strongest right now and will invade Taiwan soon

Werlemen ’21 [CJ Werlemen, Global Correspondent for Byline Times, “A US-China War Over Taiwan Appears Not Only Inevitable, But Imminent”, Byline Times, 8 October 2021, <https://bylinetimes.com/2021/10/08/a-us-china-war-over-taiwan-appears-not-only-inevitable-but-imminent/>] -Chinmay

Two years ago, in what would be his first major speech on Taiwan, Chinese President Xi Jinping warned that Taiwan’s reunification was inevitable, saying that “we make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means” and that “Taiwan’s independence goes against the trend of history and will lead to a dead end”. Earlier this week, Taiwan’s Defence Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, said that military tensions between China and Taiwan are at their highest in four decades, warning that Beijing will be in a position to launch a full-scale invasion in 2025. “For the military, the current situation is the grimmest in the more than 40 years since I joined the service,” he told Parliament. “It is capable now, but it has to calculate what it would cost, and what kind of outcome it wishes to achieve.” He warned that even a single “miscalculation” or “slight carelessness” could spark a full-blown crisis. While nearly the entire academic field of international relations has long predicted war between a rising China and a declining US is inevitable because great-power war typically occurs at the “intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline” – otherwise known as Thucydides Trap – a growing chorus of security elites are arguing an inverse of this theory. “The United States needs to prepare for a major war, not because its rival is rising but because of the opposite,” argue Hal Brands, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University. Drawing comparisons between Nazi Japan and Imperial Japan in the lead-up to the Second World War, they argue that China is reaching its most threatening point now because its economy and military production capacity has peaked at the same time that it is being increasingly shunned, condemned and isolated, as a result of its mishandling and cover-up of the Coronavirus pandemic outbreak, its persecution of its ethnic Uyghur minority, and aggressive military expansionism in the South China Sea and Himalayas. The recent multi-trillion-dollar collapse of property developer Evergrande, and the more recent billion-dollar collapse of another, Fantasia Holdings Group, reveals an economy drowning in a culmination of years of bad debt, poor decisions, corruption and negligence. These realities could force Beijing to take on a “now or never mentality… and grab what it can before it’s too late”, warn Brand and Beckley, who argue that “the most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline”. Adding further humiliation to President Xi Jinping’s leadership was the unexpected but crushing defeat of the pro-China KMT party in last year’s Taiwanese presidential election. For all of these reasons, the US, along with the UK Australia, Japan and India are behaving in a manner that suggests their respective military leaders believe that war in the Taiwan Strait, and/or elsewhere in Indo Pacific is inevitable within the next decade, with the recent establishment of actual and would-be security alliances – AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Their collective beliefs and actions were vindicated by comments delivered in Chinese state media on Thursday, warning that the threat of war is “real” and that it “may be triggered at any time”. Ultimately, there are very few reasons to believe that a US-China war over Taiwan won’t materialise within this decade or the next – making the breakaway and sovereign island state arguably the most pivotal in international politics for the foreseeable future.

#### China plans to attack this fall

Feng ’22 (John Feng is a contributing editor at newsweek. , “China Planned Taiwan Invasion in Fall, Alleged Russian Intel Leak Claims,” March 16, 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/china-planned-taiwan-invasion-fall-alleged-russian-intel-leak-claims-1688449>) -LM

Taiwan's top diplomat said he couldn't speak on the authenticity of a purported Russian intelligence document that claimed Chinese President Xi Jinping had plans to annex the island nation this fall. Joseph Wu, Taiwan's minister of foreign affairs, said on Wednesday that his country would have to prepare regardless. "No matter if or when China decides to attack us, we must always be ready to defend ourselves," he told reporters in Taipei. During a defense committee hearing in the island's legislature, Wu told lawmakers that he was aware of media reports about the document said to be written by an anonymous analyst with Russia's Federal Security Service calling themself "Wind of Change." The foreign minister said he wasn't able to verify the alleged FSB document, but said Taiwan's own intelligence services were closely monitoring relevant chatter. The letter in question is part of a series published by France-based Russian dissident Vladimir Osechkin, a human rights lawyer who runs gulagu-net.ru, a website documenting abuses in Russian jails. Osechkin claims to have received seven letters since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The FSB whistleblower has painted a detailed picture of fear and chaos inside Russia's principal intelligence service, where apparently none but a select few were aware of Putin's plans. Christo Grozev, the executive director of investigative journalism group Bellingcat, said earlier this month that his FSB contacts believe the whistleblower to be authentic, even if they didn't agree with the conclusions of his analysis. In the fourth letter to Osechkin, dated March 9, the author describes the difficult position in which Moscow has put Beijing because of Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, a move that united the West and turned Russia into such a pariah that China would find it hard to offer support. "Because of the war, Russia has such a negative image for a number of countries that the United States can easily push sanctions against China, at least with the Europeans, if it risks circumventing the sanctions on Russia," the letter read. "China depends on exports so much that, coupled with its dependence on commodity prices…this would be almost a fatal blow." The whistleblower continued: "Not only that: Xi Jinping was at least tentatively considering the capture of Taiwan in the autumn—he needs his own small victory in order to be re-elected for a third term—there is a colossal power struggle among the [party] elite. Now, after the events in Ukraine, this window of opportunity has shut, which gives the United States the opportunity to both blackmail Xi and negotiate with his [political] rivals on favorable terms."

#### Xi will invade – re-election

Zhang ’21 (Dr. Junhua Zhang is a senior associate at the European Institute for Asian Studies. He has been a professor of political science at the School of International and Public Affairs of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Zhejiang University for 10 years. , “Xi Jinping’s headaches multiply before reelection,” DECEMBER 7, 2021, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/xi-jinping-challenges/>) -LM

While China has been able to make great technological strides of its own in recent years, what has really helped its advancement is its access to Western innovations. During President Xi’s next two terms, that access is likely to be significantly restricted. Once China can no longer easily use and copy American, European and Japanese tech to boost its own industries, the government will need to find ways other than increasing productivity to raise revenue – for example by increasing taxes. The tax burden in China is already hefty, and adding to the weight will likely hurt the poor more than benefit them. Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, President Xi is an ambitious man who constantly feels the need to demonstrate his infallibility. This desire is not only in his nature, but is dictated by the immense pressure he is under – and the more he centralizes power in his own hands, the greater that pressure becomes. Once President Xi is “reelected,” the uncertainties regarding China’s economy and foreign policy will multiply. If the economy falters, he will want to draw the country’s attention to other issues – Taiwan is the low-hanging fruit here. For at least the next three years, however, retaking Taiwan by force will prove too costly for China. On the other hand, Beijing could achieve two goals by taking Pratas Island first, which is currently occupied by Taiwan. That type of operation would allow China to flex its military muscle vis-a-vis Taiwan, while potentially deterring neighbors or Western nations from pushing too hard against its claims in the South China Sea. At the same time, Beijing will further intensify its pressure on Taipei by blacklisting prominent figures and institutions it sees as favoring Taiwanese independence, hoping to strong-arm the island into compliance.

### 2AC --- No Invasion

#### A Taiwan invasion will never happen – China’ shortcomings make it incapable

**Cohen ’21** [Michael A. Cohen, Cohen (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is an American academic who is the Director of the International Affairs Program at The New School. He also works as Advisor to the Dean of the Faculty of Architecture, Design, and Urban Planning of the University of Buenos Aires., “No, Neocons, China Is Not About to Invade Taiwan”, The New Republic, November 19, 2021, [https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan]-](https://newrepublic.com/article/164485/why-china-will-not-invade-taiwan%5d-) kassounian

The United States has long played a key role in the territorial dispute. It initially signed a bilateral defense agreement with Taiwan in 1954 and over the years supplied the island with armaments. Even after recognizing the Chinese Communist government in Beijing in 1979, the U.S. has adhered to position of “strategic ambiguity” when it comes to the question of an American response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. But today, with U.S.-Chinese relations at one of the lowest points in recent memory—and as the Chinese military takes increasingly provocative military actions toward Taiwan—the fears of war have increased. So, too, have the calls for the U.S. to ratchet up its efforts to defend Taiwan, including the potential use of military force. The flames have been fanned by a host of military figures and foreign policy pundits. Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, got the party started last March when he warned a Senate committee that China could invade Taiwan “in the next six years.”. Writing in *The Wall Street Journal,* former Trump Defense official Elbridge Colby [ramped up the threat-mongering by declaring](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fight-for-taiwan-could-come-soon-china-navy-defense-11635349097), “Beijing has made clear it is willing to use force to take Taiwan.… And this isn’t mere talk. The Chinese military has rehearsed amphibious attacks, and commercial satellite imagery shows that China practices large-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the region.” In the Bible of the foreign policy establishment, *Foreign Affairs,* Orianna Skylar Mastro, a fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, [warned](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation) that “whereas Chinese leaders used to view a military campaign to take the island as a fantasy, now they consider it a real possibility.” Yes, [China could invade Taiwan](https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/yes-china-could-invade-taiwan), says the Heritage Foundation. And Taiwan’s top defense official—perhaps not surprisingly—warned recently that China will be able to mount [a “full-scale” invasion of Taiwan](https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/06/asia/taiwan-defense-minister-china-attack-intl-hnk/index.html) by 2025.Some U.S. policymakers have taken these warnings to heart. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton has called for the U.S. to end its policy of “strategic ambiguity” and make clear its willingness to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley warned recently that “if China takes control of Taiwan, Beijing will be emboldened to seize other territories around the globe” and called on the U.S. to increase pressure on China, including a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing. But how legitimate are these fears? Is the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan a serious and urgent concern? The answer is “not very.” And it’s a view, ironically, endorsed by the Pentagon. Earlier this month, the Defense Department released its annual report to Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” While the report lays out the ways in which China’s “People’s Liberation Army” is seeking to modernize its forces, the threat to Taiwan of armed invasion is still minimal at best: Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the PRC’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency, even assuming a successful landing and breakout, make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. One might expect that a country intent on launching the largest and most difficult amphibious invasion in history would be making intense preparations. That’s not happening. As the Pentagon report notes, Chinese naval investments have focused on building up the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon also finds that while China is focusing on conducting joint operations that involve forces from the army, navy, and air force, as of present it currently lacks such capabilities. The soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. That the Chinese military enjoys vast military superiority vis-à-vis Taiwan is not in doubt. But that such resources can be used to mount an amphibious assault is something else altogether. The Chinese military last fought a war in 1979 against Vietnam, and the PLA was badly bloodied. That means that the soldiers and officers who make up China’s military today have virtually no direct combat experience. China’s own media outlets have, according to the Pentagon, noted the PLA’s shortcomings, which include that “commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” These problems would be challenging enough in a conventional conflict. For a complex invasion of Taiwan, they would render such efforts virtually impossible. One big reason is that Taiwan is about as inhospitable an environment as can be imagined for an amphibious invasion. Ian Easton, a defense expert who has written extensively about Taiwan defense strategy, wrote earlier this year that the country’s “coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches, and they are bordered by cliffs and urban jungles.” Easton also notes that “many of Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns. Their granite hills have been honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.”

## AT: Philippines Add-on

### AT: Philippines Key

#### Philippines are not a strategic partner.

Bandow ’21 (Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties. He worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Times, “The Philippines: America’s Perpetually Useless Ally”, CATO Institute, April 28 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/philippines-americas-perpetually-useless-ally)-BS

China has parked its fishing fleet in waters claimed by the Philippines. Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte has fulminated ineffectively. So far, at least, the Biden administration has declined to go to war on Manila’s behalf. But the possibility remains so long as the U.S. foolishly guarantees Philippine security. Indeed, some things never change. One is the limited value of the Philippines as an ally. Its people are friendly and welcoming — and quite pro‐​American. But it is a semi‐​failed state with a military to match. Manila is a sad example of how the US has picked up the old German habit of allying with the least stable nations possessing the weakest militaries — as Berlin did with Austro‐​Hungary in World War I and Italy in World War II. In the case of Washington the primes useless partner is the Philippines. The relationship wouldn’t matter so much if Manila didn’t expect America to protect not only its home islands, but also every useless piece of rock claimed by the Philippines against China, such as Scarborough Shoal. If Beijing and Washington end up at war — a horrific possibility — the cause should be more serious than the Philippines. Manila is as an American ally because of blatant US imperialism. The early Americans revolted against empire and eschewed overseas adventurism as they overspread the North American continent. However, the Sirens of Asia attracted Washington. After the US went to war with Spain, formally to liberate Cuba promoted by a simultaneously scurrilous and scandalous “Yellow Press” propaganda campaign, American forces seized the Philippines as well. Famed imperialists declared that the oceans made the archipelago contiguous, and thus an appropriate target of annexation. Washington should drop its defense guarantee and begin negotiations to turn the faux mutual defense treaty into a real treaty of mutual cooperation. Alas, the Filipinos had other ideas, having already launched a domestic independence movement. What followed was three years of ruthless irregular warfare, featuring “concentration zones,” which US soldiers compared to Washington’s veritable extermination campaigns against native Americans. War crimes mixed with starvation to kill 200,000 or more Filipino civilians. Resentment long lingered, especially in some Muslim‐​majority islands, such as Mindanao, where armed opposition to the central government continues. Even Duterte raised the issue, demanding the return of the famed Balangiga Bells, taken as war booty and which, he reasonably contended, “are reminders of the gallantry and heroism of our forebears … who resisted the American colonization and sacrificed their lives in the process.” Washington finally granted the archipelago’s independence in 1946, after the Philippines’ liberation from Japan. The US approved the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which, like similar agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Europe (NATO), effectively ran only one way, committing the US to defend the Philippines. Four decades later a deteriorating bilateral relationship and volcanic eruption pushed America out of both Clark Airfield and Subic Bay. The departure was long overdue. The archipelago obviously matters not at all to defending America itself. Washington would prefer that Manila rather than Beijing control resources and waterways in the region, but the practical impact on the US is marginal. Base access always is useful. However, no Philippine president, even one calmer and friendlier than Rodrigo Duterte, would likely make his or her nation available for American military operations against the PRC except to defend against an unlikely attack on the archipelago. Aiding America against Beijing would make the Philippines a permanent enemy of China, which will always be close by.

### AT: Presence Deters China

#### US presence in the SCS is destabilizing – causes war

Valencia 21 (Mark Valencia, Mark J Valencia is an internationally recognized maritime policy analyst, political commentator and consultant focused on Asia. Most recently he was a visiting senior scholar at China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies and continues to be an adjunct senior scholar with the Institute. Valencia has published some 15 books and more than 100 peer-reviewed journal articles, ‘Seeds of war in the South China Sea’, Asia Times Holdings Limited, July 27, 2021, https://asiatimes.com/2021/07/seeds-of-war-in-the-south-china-sea/)

War between China and the US is not inevitable. But it is becoming increasingly likely, and the South China Sea bears its seeds.In their meeting on Monday in Tianjin, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly told US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman that China had [three bottom lines](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3142612/china-us-draw-lines-sand-top-level-meeting-agree-keep-talking?module=lead_hero_story_1&pgtype=homepage): **“**The United States must not challenge or seek to subvert China’s model of governance; it must not interfere in China’s development; and it must not violate China’s sovereignty or harm its territorial integrity.” The US continues to do all three. Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Xie Feng “expressed [China’s] strong dissatisfaction towards the wrong remarks and actions of the US” regarding the origins of Covid-19, Taiwan, [Xinjiang](https://www.scmp.com/knowledge/places/xinjiang?module=inline_auto&pgtype=article), Hong Kong and the South China Sea. US President Joe Biden has publicly [identified](https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/25/politics/biden-autocracies-versus-democracies/index.html;%20https:/www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3142130/xi-believes-autocracies-will-fare-better-democracies-says) what he considers a long-term existential threat to Americans’ fundamental political beliefs and way of life. He says autocracies like China and Russia are betting that their systems will out-compete democracies in addressing the enormous complex challenges of the 21st century. He explained that they think democracies, with their unwieldy checks and balances, will not be able to function efficiently and effectively to meet these challenges. In short, they think that they can satisfy their populaces by providing continuity and stability and thus human security rather than Western-style unrestricted individual freedoms and resultant chaos and insecurity. So, the two are on a fundamental collision course driven by competing ideologies and visions of the “international order.”Although it is still possible to compromise and co-exist, neither is inclined to do so. The “threat” of China now drives US foreign policy. The US is applying “whole of government” pressure on China – instituting sanctions because of what it considers unfair economic practices, theft of intellectual property, cyber hacking, its harsh treatment of minorities in Xinjiang, its political crackdown in Hong Kong and its bullying in the South China Sea.

### AT: SCS Goes Nuclear

#### **China will not use nuclear weapons in the SCS**

Quiggin ’21 [John Quiggin, Australian economist, a Professor and Laureate Fellow at the University of Queensland. He is a Fellow of numerous learned bodies including the Econometric Society, and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, “Myths that stir trouble in the South China Sea”, theinterpreter, Dec 23 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/myths-stir-trouble-south-china-sea>] -Chinmay

In 1964, when China first tested nuclear weapons, Mao Zedong used to claim that the country was populous enough to survive an all-out nuclear attack. His successors are under no such illusion. And Mao’s statement was made in the context of announcing a “no first strike” policy, to which China has adhered ever since. There is no evidence that China has any intention of using nuclear weapons except as a deterrent to a nuclear attack by another power The mutual sabre-rattling associated with South China Sea mythology is beneficial to a variety of actors in the United States, China and elsewhere. The military-industrial complex, against which President Eisenhower warned 60 years ago, is powerful in every country, and always seeks to promote preparation for large-scale war as well as the routine use of military power for political and commercial ends. Nationalist politicians promote territorial claims of all kinds, and exaggerate their importance. And both Chinese and Taiwanese governments have good reasons to keep the idea of an invasion of Taiwan alive.